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Searching Cell Phones Incident to Arrest:
Can Courts and Legi~latures Impose
Limits on a Bright Line Rule?*
by Adam M. Gershowitz
Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law

Imagine that Defendant Dan is stopped by the police for driving through a stop sign. The officer thinks that Dan looks suspicious, but has no probable cause to believe Dan has done anything illegal, other than driving recklessly. Because running a stop
sign is an arrestable offense and the officer is suspicious that Dan
might be involved in more serious criminal activity, the officer
arrests Dan for the traffic violation.
Under the search incident to arrest doctrine, officers are entitled
to search the body of the arrestee to ensure that he does not have
weapons and to prevent him from destroying evidence. The search
incident to arrest is automatic and allows officers to open containers found on the person, even when there is no probable cause to
believe anything illegal is inside. For instance, a standard search
incident to arrest often turns up drugs located in a small container
such as a cigarette pack. Yet, Dan does not have a cigarette pack
in hi s pllcke t: instead. like millions of ()th~r tcchnophilc s, f) ;1I1 is
ca rry ing '~lr1 iPhonc.
The officer removes the iPhone from Dan's pocket ,lIld begi ns to nmunagc through Dan's cell phone contacts, call history,
emails, pictures, movies, and, perhaps most significantly, his internet browsing history. Thus, in addition to finding Dan's personal
financial data and embarrassing personal information, the police
also discover incriminating pictures of stolen contraband, em ails
evidencing drug transactions, and internet surfmg of websites
containing child pornography. Is all of this evidence admissible
even though Dan has only been arrested for a traffic infraction and
there was no probable cause (not to mention no warrant) to search
the contents of his iPhone? When one considers the breadth of
infonnation located in Dan's iPhone, it would seem shocking that

officers need no suspicion whatsoever in order to search through
that information. Yet, that result appears to follow from longstanding U.S. Supreme Court precedent laid down well before handheld technology was even contemplated.

... il we think 01 an iPhone as a
container-like a cigarette package
or a closed box-police can open
and search the contents inside with
no questions asked and no probable
cause required, so long as they are
dotng so pursuant to a valid arrest.
For nearly four decades, th e search incident (0 arrest doctrine
has functioned as a bright-line rule ~ allowing police to search the
entire person of an arrestee without getting into sticky questions of
whether there was probable cause to open a particular container.
See U.S . v. Robinson, 414 U.S . 218, 235 (1973). While society and
technology have changed drastically over the last few decades,
the search incident to arrest rule has remained static. Thus, if we
think of an iPhone as a container- like a cigarette package or a
closed box- police can open and search the contents inside with
no questions asked and no probable cause required, so long as
they are doing so pursuant to a valid arrest. And as scholars have
long recognized, states have expansive criminal codes that give
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police authority to arrest for a huge number of infractions, Thus,
police officers with nothing more than a hunch of illegal activity
may arrest an individual for a simple traffic violation, Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), and proceed to search
thousands of pages of private data located on the iPhone found in
an arrestee's pocket.
This issue of Search & Seizure Law Report provides an overview of the history and scope of the search incident to arrest
exception to the warrant requirement. It then explains the complicated problems that develop when this doctrine is applied to
iPhones and other advanced cell phones. It also offers a number
of approaches that courts and legislatures could adopt to narrow
the scope of warrantless searches of iPhones and similar handheld
wireless devices.

Search incident to arrest doctrine as a
search for bright-line rules
The Fourth Amendment provides that "no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause." Yet, as any criminal procedure student
10

knows, the Supreme Court has long recognized a slew of exceptions allowing the police to search without fust lProcuring a warrant. There is One exception of particular significance, perhaps the
most common rationale for police to search without a warrantthe search incident to arrest doctrine.
,(
The history of the search incident to arrest exception dates back
to the creation of the exclusionary rule in 1914, when the Supreme
Court obliquely suggested in dictum that the government has the
right "to search the person of the accused when legally arrested,
to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime." Weeks v.
U.s., 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). Although the Court alluded to
such searches in that case and a handful of other early decisions,
the doctrine's modem conception was the 1969 decision in Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
In Chimel, police arrested a suspect in his home for burglary
and proceeded to search the entire three-bedroom house, as well
as the attic and garage, for proceeds of that burglary. While the
Court found this warrantless search to be unconstitutionally broad,
it nevertheless recognized that police can search suspects incident
to arrest in narrower circumstances. The Court explained that a
search incident to arrest must be limited to a search for weapons
that an arrestee could use against the officer and to prevent an
arrestee from concealing or destroying evidence. The Court concluded that a search for weapons and evidence must be limited to
the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control
from which he might gain possession of a weapon or destroy evidence. The Court specifically rejected the contention that police
could search areas beyond that from which an arrestee could grab
a weapon or evidence.
A few years after Chimel, the Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether police could open closed containers located
on an arrestee's person. In U.s. v. Robinson,414 U.s. 218 (1973),
police arrested a suspect for operating a motor vehicle with a revoked license. While conducting a search incident to arrest, the
officer felt an object in Robinson's coat pocket but could not tell
what it was. The officer reached into the pocket and pulled out a
"crumpled up cigarette package." Still not sure what was in the
package, the officq opened it and discovcr('d capsuks of heroin.
tn !ejecting Rubinsnn's challenge tu the'. sl.'alch, tile Court made
clear that olticers conJucting a search incident to alTest (an open
and search through all items on an arrestee's person, even if they
are in a closed container, and even if the officers have no sllspicion
that the contents of the container are illegal. The Court explained
that the search incident to arrest doctrine does not require case-bycase adjudication and that there need not be analysis of each step
of the search to detennine whether it was necessary to prevent the
arrestee from acquiring weapons or destroying evidence. Rather,
Robinson made clear that searches of the arrestee's person and the
containers thereon can be conducted automatically incident to an
arrest. The Court's decision thus created a bright-line rule.
The Court's affinity for bright-line rules became even clearer
eight years later in New York v. Beltoll, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). In
Belton, the officer stopped a car for speeding and. upon smelling
marijuana, arrested the occupants. With the occupants away from
the vehicle, the officer then searched the passenger compartment
of the car and found a jacket in the backseat. The officer unzipped
the pockets of the jacket and found cocaine. Praising its decision
in Robinson, the Court reafftrmed that police officers must be afforded "a straightforward rule, easily applied, and predictably enforced." Lamenting that there was not yet such a straightforward
rule for the search of the interior of a car at a traffic stop, the Court
adopted another bright-line rule pennitting the search of the entire
passenger compartment of an automobile when an occupant of the
car is lawfully arrested.
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Just as in Robinson, the Court made clear that the bright-line
rule would apply even if there were no chance that an arrestee

could break free of his restraints to grab a weapon or destroy evidence in the passenger compartment of the car. The Court further
explained that the search of the passenger compartment included
any containers found therein, whether open or closed, and irre-

(

spective of whether they could contain a weapon or evidence. The
Belton decision marked a considerable expansion of the search
incident to arrest doctrine.
In the Court's last significant search incident to arrest decision,
Thornton v. U.s., 541 U.S. 615 (2004), an automobile was again
the focus of attention. Unlike the occupant in Belton, the Thornton
case involved a driver who had already exited and walked away
from his vehicle before being approached by police. After Thornton was arrested for drug possession, the officer then proceeded to
his vehicle and searched the passenger compartment incident to
arrest. The officer found a handgun under the seat, which led to a
charge of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking
crime. The Court once again stressed the need for a "clear rule,
readily understood by police officers and not depending on differing estimates of what items were or Were not within reach of an
arrestee at any particular moment." In rejecting Thornton's suppression argument, the Court extended the Belton rule to permit a
full-scale search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to the arrest of a "recent occupant" of a vehicle.
The Court's decisions over the last forty years suggest that
the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement
should be interpreted expansively. Indeed, in Belton, the Court
specifically stated that "container" should be interpreted broadly
to include "any object capable of holding another object. It thus
includes closed or open glove compartments, consoles, or other
receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment,
as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like." Consistent
with this guidance,lower courts have taken a broad approach and
upheld searches of numerous small containers incident to arrest,
such as wallets, U.S. v. RodrigIlez, 995 F.2d 776, 778 (7th Cir.
1993), envelopes, U.S. v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868, 872 (8th Cir.
1985), and. aspirin bottles, Dalliels v. State, 416 So.2d 760 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1982). Although some state courts have interpreted
thelr own \.'llJlstitutit)J]s and criminal l'cdt's to be Jl1U[t' rcst!ictive
thall Iht' U.S. Constitution, !llo:;t lower courts have nut hesitated
to apply the search incident to arrest doctrine to new sihHltions
unforeseen by the Supreme COllrt.

Bright-line rules in an era of pagers
and cell phones
The Supreme Court's decisions in Robinson and Belton made
clear that, incident to a lawful arrest, officers can open contain-ers located on a person or in their immediate grabbing space
without having any independent probable cause to search those
containers. For many years, the only evidence found as a result
of such searches was tangible physical evidence, such as drugs
or illegal weapons. As technology has advanced however,lower
courts have been forced to rule On the admissibility of nontangible
digital evidence located in electronic devices, specifically pagers, cell phones, and computers. These courts have been forced to
confront whether the search incident to arrest doctrine-designed
with a world of tangible evidence in mind-should apply to data
digitally contained in electronic devices. Most courts have upheld
such searches.
The earliest of these electronic data cases (and consequently
the most primitive of the technology at issue) was a 1993 decision from the Northern District of California dealing with a pager
found on an arrestee. U.S. v. Chal!, 830 F, Supp. 531 (N.D. Cal.
1993). The defendant, Chan, was arrested as part of a drug sting
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operation and police found a pager on Chan's person. The police
then activated the pager's memory function an4 retrieved telephone numbers stored inside it. Two numbers found in the pager
linked Chan to the drug sting the policy were conducting. Chan
contended that he had a reasonable expectatiQn of privacy in the
pager and that activating it amounted to a search that required a
warrant.
The court sided with Chan in part by agreeing that a pager is
analogous to a closed container and that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of electronic con~
tainers. However, the court ultimately concluded that because the
search of the pager came on the heels of a lawful arrest of Chan, a
warrantless search was permitted under the search incident to arrest doctrine. Citing Belton and Chimel, the court concluded that
an containers can be searched incident to a lawful arrest, inclUding
electronic containers. Moreover, the court considered and specifi~
cally rejected as irrelevant the fact that Chan could not retrieve a
weapon from the pager nor plausibly destroy any evidence from'
the pager. Accordingly, the evidence found when the officer turned
on and searched the pager was admissible.
Over the next few years, a handful of other courts were called
upon to analyze the question raised in Chan and these courts like~
wise pennitted the search of the contents of a pager incident to
arrest. See U.s. v. Hunter, 1998 WL 887289, at *3 (4th Cir. Oct.
29,1998) (per curiam); U.s. v. Ortiz, 84 F,3d 977, 983--84 (7th
Cir. 1996); U.S. v. Stroud, 1994 WL 711908, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec.
21,1994); U.s. v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 1223 (11th Cir.
1993); U.s. v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818, 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); U.s.
v. Lynch, 908 F, Supp. 284, 290 (D.V.1. 1995).
The era of pagers has all but ended, making way for the age
of cell phones. To date, approximately two dozen courts have addressed searches of cell phones incident to arrest. The Fifth Circuit's recent decision in U.S. v. Finley, 477 FJd 250 (5~ Cir. 2007)
is representative. Police arrested Finley after a staged drug sale.
The police then searched Finley incident to arrest and found a cell
phone in his pocket. One of the investigating officers searched
through the phone's records and found text messages that appeared to relate to dmg trafficking. One incoming text message
----------
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said, "So u wanna get some frozen agua," a common teml for
methamphetamine. Another text message said, "Call Mark I need
a 50," a likely reference to asking for fifty dollars' worth ofnarcotics. Finley was convicted of aiding and abetting drug possession
with intent to distribute.
On appeal, Finley contended that the search of his cell phone
was unlawful. The Fifth Circuit rejected Finley's contention that
the cell phone could be seized but not searched. Relying on the
conventional search incident to arrest caselaw-namely Robinson
and Belton-the court explained that "police officers are not constrained to search only for weapons or instruments of escape on
the arrestee's person; they may also, without any additional justification, look for evidence of the arrestee's crime on his person
in order to preserve it for use at trial." The court further explained
that police can open containers found on the arrestee's person and
saw no reason why the doctrine should not be extended to text
messages contained in a cell phone.
In short, the Fifth Circuit did not recognize any conceptual difference between searching a person's body or physical containers
on that body for drugs and searching electronic equipment for digital infonnation. As of December 2008, nearly twenty other courts
have reached the same conclusion as the Fifth Circuit and admitted evidence seized from cell phones incident to arrest. See People
v. Shepard, 2008 WL4824083 (CaI.App. 6 Dist. Nov. 7,2008), at
*2; Slale v. Harris, 2008 WL 4368209, at *3-4 (Ariz. App. Sept.
23,2008); Slale v. Smilh, 2008 WL 2861693, at *6-8 (Ohio App.
July 25,2008); People v. Diaz, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 215, 219 (Cal.
App.2 Dist. 2008); U.S. v. Salllillall, 571 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 110203 (D. Ariz. 2008); U.s. v. YOllllg, 278 Fed. Appx. 242, 245-46
(4~ Cir. May 15,2008); U.s. v. Deans, 549 F. Supp.2d 1085, 1094
(D. Minn. 2008); U.S. v. Valdez, 2008 WL 360548, at *3 (E.D.
Wis. Feb. 8, 2008); U.s. v. Carrol, 537 F. Supp.2d 1290, 1301-02
(N.D. Ga. 2008); U.s. v. Cllrry, 2008 WI. 219966, at *8-10 (D.
Me. Jan. 23,2008); U.s. v. Lollie, 2007 WL 4722439, at *4 (N.D.
Ind. Oct. 12,2007); U.s. v. Mercado-Nava,486 F. Supp. 2d 1271,
1275-76 (D. Kan. 2007); U.S. v. Murphy, 2006 WI. 3761384, at
*4 (W.D. Va. Dec. 20,2006); u.s. v. Diaz, 2006 WI. 3193770, at
''4-5 (N D, Cal, Nov. 2,20(6); u.s. 1', 7mllotll, 2006 \VL <-118390.
at "5 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 21,20(6); U.s. v. Cole, 2005 IVL 1323343. at
*6 (N.D. III. May 26,2006); U.S. v. Brookes, 20051V1. 1940124,
at *3 (D.V.Uune 16,2005); U.S. v. Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1291,
1303..D4 (D. Kan. 2003).
To be sure, two lower courts have suppressed evidence found
on cell phones pursuant to a search incident to arrest. See U.s. v.
Park,2oo7 WI. 1521573, at *11-12 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007);
U.s. v. Losalle, 2007 WL 1390820, at *7-8 (D. Haw. May 9,
2007). Yet, those decisions rested primarily on grounds that the
search took place too long after the arrest to be considered a contemporaneous search incident to arrest.
Perhaps the reason for the lack of contrary authority is that
searching a conventional cell phone or pager incident to arrest
is relatively easy to square with precedent that pennits police to
search tangible containers found on an arrestee. A cell phone's
memory of incoming and outgoing caUs, as well as its text messages, can easily be analogized to an address book Or a letter in an
envelope, Much as the traditional search incident to arrest cases
permit police to open a wallet, take out a letter, and read it before the arrestee has an opportunity to destroy the evidence, it "also
makes sense to allow the police to review electronic call histories
and text messages in a cell phone, An arrestee familiar with the
functions of his cell phone could just as easily delete text messages or call logs as he could tear up a letter or an incriminating
list of addresses on a piece of paper.
12
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Stakes and likely results when iPhone
meets search incident to arrest
doctrine
To date, no court has been cal1ed upon t6 address the constitutionality of searching an iPhone. In light of the handful of cell
phone and pager cases discussed by the lower federal and state
courts, it might seem that there is no difference in searching an
iPhone. Just as text messages stored on a cell phone are evidence
within a digital container, it would seem that caB histories, emails,
and pictures on an iPhone would simply be characterized as evidence stored in a (larger) digital container. As a conceptual matter, there is no real difference between a crumpled up cigarette
package, an early-generation ceB phone, and an iPhone with a
much larger memory, Yet, this is cause for concern because no
matter what theoretical similarities exist between an iPhone and
a conventional cell phone (or a cigarette package for that matter),
the former stores' tremendously more information and in a' very
different way. The differences can be demonstrated by thinking
about how many steps or searches police might be able to take
with respect to the new and old technology.
The cell phone and pager cases decided by courts in the last few
years are what we might call first level cases because they do not
require in-depth searching to obtain evidence. Police need to push
only a limited number of buttons in order to reach pager numbers
and only a few additional buttons to retrieve text messages, If we
think of each step that police must take to retrieve infonnation as
a separate search, then reviewing pager numbers might amount to
only two levels of searches: first, pushing the memory button for
the list of recent pages; and second, scrolling through the numbers
to fmd the incriminating calls, Reviewing text messages on a cell
phone can be conceptualized as three separate searches: (1) open":
ing the text message function; (2) opening the list of received text
messages; and (3) opening and reading a particular text message.
This is similar to the searches in Robinson where the police officer
(I) felt the cigarette package; (2) pulled out the package; and (3)
opened the package.
Put simply, the data on early-generation cell phones is limited
ill it~ <lrnollnt and usefulness. and pl)\il'l' officers will t>ither find
the evidence or rUIl into a dead end mther qllickly. Accordingly.
the degree of privacy invasion can be me<lsured by the number or
steps an officer must take to retrieve the incriminating infonnation. In the cases decided to date dealing with text messages and
pagers, this number has been small because those devices have
few, relatively simple functions capable of storing electronic data.
The same can be said for tangible evidence such as cigarette pack~
ages, purses, wallets, or suitcases.

.. ,the iPhone stores tremendously
more information ...
The iPhone drastically changes this situation for two reasons.
First, the iPhone stores tremendously more infonnation-thereby
providing law enforcement with access to infonnation that the
typical arrestee would otherwise be incapable of carrying in his
pocket. In addition to the text messages, contact infonnation, and
caU histories found on conventional phones, iPhones also contain
an iPhoto application. This application holds far more pictures
than could be stored on a conventional cell phone and displays
them in much clearer detaiL Similarly, the iPhone's easily accessible email application makes it simple to access thousands of
new, saved, and sent email messages. The iPhone enables USers to
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store thousands of audio and video files. Music, books, and videos
ranging from classical music to potentially obscene pornographic
videos can be accessed with the touch of a few buttons.
Second, and perhaps with greater ramifications than the data
stored on the actual device, the iPhone provides a mechanism
for accessing information via the internet. The iPhone's internet
browser is just like the one found on a standard computer; it can

dial out and retrieve information stored remotely with an internet
service provider. An example is instructive.
Imagine that an officer arrests an individual following a lawful
traffic stop and finds an iPhone in the driver's pocket. The officer
then takes the following steps: (1) activates the touch screen to
view the phone's contents; (2) clicks on the internet browser icon;
(3) clicks on the toolbar to find the bookmarks link; (4) finds a
suspicious-looking bookmark labeled "porn pictures"; (5) clicks
on that particular bookmark to bring up the webpage; (6) sees that
the webpage contains a series of icons including a "members" button and clicks on that image; (7) brings up the "members" page
which has a saved account number and password already entered;
(8) clicks on the "submit" button which utilizes the saved account
infonnation and password to bring up the content of the website;
(9) sees that, in addition to pictures, the website also has a message function and the account owner has two new messages; and
(10) clicks on the message icon and brings up the two new messages, both of which detail an incriminating conversation about
exchanging pictures of underage children.
Or imagine how an officer could utilize the internet to circumvent an arrestee's privacy protections, such as if an arrestee
had password-protected his iPhoto application to hide his photographs. After (I) turning on the iPhone; and (2) attempting to open
the iPhoto application, the officer discovers that the application
is password-protected and cannot be opened. The officer might
then (3) activate the internet browser; (4) click on the browsing
history to see what webpages the owner had visited; (5) click on
the history link that referenced the arrestee's web-based email
account-for instance, Yahoo! or GmaiI; (6) read through the
folders in the email account until finding one labeled "personal
infomlation"; (7) read through the messages in that folder until
finding ,'In enwil with the subject "p~sswords"; (8) open that email
and retlieve the password for the iPhoto application; (9) close the
intemd browser and again click on the iPhoto application; (10)
enter the password found in the email, thus opening the iPhoto
application; (11) search through the folders in the iPhoto application, finding the most suspiciously labeled folder-for instance,
"kid pics"; and (12) open that folder and search through all of the
pictures inside that folder.
Countless other complicated scenarios could likewise be envisioned. As the scenarios become more convoluted, it becomes
harder to analogize them to a closed container or a wallet containing an address list. And indeed, the iPhone provides access to
information that would almost never before be found in arrestees'
pockets or immediate grabbing space, but which could potentially
subject them to criminal prosecution. For instance: (I) bank statements accessed via the saved password on your banking website
or (2) MySpace or Facebook webpages that have personal data,
pictures, contacts, and exchanges of messages.
In searching for incriminating infonnation, officers will no
doubt come into contact with extremely sensitive personal infonnation that is not remotely illegal but which is nevertheless
highly embarrassing. For instance, by searching an arrestee's internet browsing history, police might stumble across chat rooms
demonstrating that the arrestee has unusual sexual proclivities. Or
police might discover that the arrestee is homosexual and is trying
to keep that information secret from her family or employer. If
the arrestee is a politician, the ramifications would be particularly
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devastating if police were to discover from his emails that he has
been having an affair or that he made derogatory) comments about
other political figures. Additionally, an arrestee's internet browsing history or his bookmarked webpages might lead to a health
insurance website that includes bills for a s~rious or embarrassing medical condition. lbe list of scenarios is endless. And while
such embarrassing, but not incriminating, information probably
would not be admissible in a prosecution, its discovery would
cause emotional distress. Moreover, while noncriminal information should never be released beyond the initial traffic stop if it has
no place in a prosecution, it sometimes manages to find its way
into the public domain.
In sum, the search incident to arrest doctrine pennits police to
search the contents of any container found on the arrestee, including electronic receptacles of digital information. Courts already
have held that the doctrine applies to the electronic contents of
pagers and cell phones and pennits the copying of phone numbers
and the reading of text messages. If courts take the next stepand they almost certainly will-by applying the search incident
to arrest doctrine to the iPhone, officers will be in a position to
review incoming and outgoing call histories, scan contact lists,
read thousands of emails, view nearly limitless numbers of color
photographs and movies, listen to voicemail at the touch of the
button, and view the internet websites that an arrestee has visited.

Disentangling iPhone from bright-line
rule: possible approaches to cabining
search incident to arrest doctrine
The difference between the data found on a cell phone and an
iPhone is dramatic but, at present, the Fourth Amendment and its
search incident to arrest doctrine make no distinction. Below, I offer approaches that courts and legislatures might adopt to address
the problem.

Change nothing: search incident to
arrest rule works well, so changing it
to account for new technology is not
good idea
While it is undoubtedly troubling to permit sllspicioniess
searches of the many applications of an iPhone, one could plausibly argue that attempting to craft a rule disallowing such searches
would be worse. At present, the search incident to arrest doctrine
is a bright-line rule that is easy for police officers to understand
and apply. And courts faced with a search incident to arrest usually
have an easy time determining whether the officers' actions were
permissible. Compare this to the rest of Fourth Amendment law,
which is riddled with exceptions, caveats, and uncertainty. Indeed,
the typical Fourth Amendment section of a criminal procedure
textbook is at least twice as long as the Fifth Amendment section.
Carving out an exception to the search incident to arrest doctrine
to deal with the iPhone might afford more privacy protection to a
device that is capable of holding reams of personal infonnation
that individuals reasonably expect to be protected against government intrusion, but at what cost? There is a colorable argument
that any benefit to be had from a new rule would be outweighed
by muddling one of the few areas of Fourth Amendment law that
is currently intelligible.
Nevertheless, while I do not desire that Fourth Amendment law
be made any more complicated, ultimately, I am not convinced
that courts should restrain themselves by applying an ill-fitting
bright-line rule to the iPhone. I see two primary reasons.
First, the major infonnal constraints typically facing police in
executing searches are not present with respect to the iPhone. Po-
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lice investigations are ordinarily c~nstrained by limited resources
and limited time. For example, while the Supreme Co~rt has held
h t there is no Fourth Amendment search when pohee observe
~:Ckyards from helicopters or plane~, Fl?rida v: Riley, 488 U.S.
445 (1989) (plurality opInIOn); Cali/orilla v. Oraolo, 476 U.S.
207 (1986), that has not enabled police to do so with imp~nity.
pre departments typically cannot afford to buy or rent hehcop-

o lenor do they have the time to file flight plans, spend hours in

thers, 'r and simply look around without being guided by some
teat,
..

particularized SUSpICion.

The iPhone drastically changes the
amount of private information that
can be accessed during a search
incident to arrest.
With respect to the iPhon~, however, !h: new ~ec~n.ology inverts the typical state of affaus because It IS the mdlvldual. ~ot
h police officer. who has the new technology. Moreover, unlike
t e ers the technology is everywhere. Apple is expected to sell
.
Il yOv ,
than ten million IPhones by the end of 2008. In the next
' II y
morede millions of clnvers
.
WI'11 have an 1'Phone or a su b
stantm
deca,
. poc k
' many 0 fh
. 'lar device in theu
etsdunng
t e nearlhirt
yt y

sl~III'on traffic stops that occur each year, And unlike helicop-

i 'In searc h"109 IS aImost
r airnlane flyovers, the cost to poIce
0
~r
. S tattshcs
. . loun
&
d t hat poI'Ice
ters
'I A
study
by the Bureau 0 f Justlce
ru. hed the car or the driver in 6,6 percent of the twenty-seven
"1
U pwards
seare
'11' n traffic stops that occurred
10 a parhcu ar year,
ITII
!O 000 searches were cand ucte d"d
f 470
InCI ent to arrest at a tra ffiIC
o
S~e BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
~~~TICE CHARACTERISTICS OF DRIVERS STOPPED BY
POLlCE, '1999, at 1,4 (2002). If police are ~lready conducting
searches incident to arrest, they can eaSIly take a few exsuc h aments to seize the ·
Ptum
h
.
lone,
It ·
on,·
an d start n1mmagmg
lra m
. .
through its files and applications.
lh~ iPhllJl<.: dl-a:o;(ically Ch;11.1g.e~ the ;Ullot.l1lt .Dr private inform<1.
{I . { "Ill Ill' '
'lCct..':-;scd
dunn!o':' a search
lI1cldent
to arrest. BEllOIl h1 L,
.
.
...._
cause the stakes <.W! higher a.nd ~()tentIally could aftect 1.1lI1~IOnS ot
individuals, it is worth consldenng wheth~r the search Hlcldent to
arrest doctrine might be amended to fix thiS problem.
ml 1

Change everything: limiting search
incident to arrest doctrine in all police
interactions to search related to crime
of arrest
The most drastic change to the search incident to arrest doct . e-short of abolishing it altogether-would be to limit officers
::~earching for evidence of the crime for which the suspect was
arrested. Thus if the driver were arrested for drug possession, police could sear~h anywhere drugs might be found. But if the driver
were arrested for failure to wear a seatbelt, a search for drugs
would be impennissible. Justice Antonin Scalia advocated this
'revision to the search incident to arrest doctrine in his 2004 concurring opinion in Thornton v. U.s., in which the Supreme Court
upheld the search of the pa.ssenger compart~ent of a "r~cent1y"
occupied car. Joined by Justlce Ruth Bader GInsburg, JustICe Scalia argued that searching a vehicle incide~t to ar,rest should only
be pennitted when "it is reasonabl~ to behev.e eV,I,denc~ relate~
the crime of arrest might be found In the vehIcle. JustIce ScalIa s
view departs from the traditional rationale for the search incident
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to arrest doctrine. Instead of conducting the searches to prevent
the arrestee from harming the officer or destroying evidence, such
searches would be justified as "evidence-gathering\' exercises that
can be conducted because of "a reasona.ble belief that evidence
,
[will] be found."
i
Justice Scalia wrote for only himself and Justice Ginsburg in
expressing this view, so we might be inclined to dismiss this approach as simply unlikely to be adopted. However, it is not altogether implausible to assume that Justice Scalia's position may
some day command a majority: Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have not yet had a chance to address this approach, and
Justice Stevens and Justice Souter are on record as being very
dissatisfied with the current state of the search incident to arrest
doctrine.
Besides its unlikely adoption, perhaps a stronger objection to
Justice Scalia's approach is that the evidence-gathering approach
lacks doctrinal justification. Searching to gather evidence during
a search incident to arrest is troubling because it would pennit
searches based on suspicion-rather than officer safety-that involve less than probable cause, Likewise, such an approach would
offer no justification for pennitting searches of the passenger
compartment incident to arrest but not the tnlnk of the vehicle.
On the plus side, Justice Scalia's approach would solve the iPhone dilemma by reconceptualizing the entire search incident to
arrest doctrine, without requiring a special rule for particular new
technology. If police could only search for evidence related to the
crime of arrest, most traffic stops would not pennit searches of an
iPhone's contents. And even when police were pennitted to search
an iPhone incident to arrest, the scope of the search would be limited, If an officer arrested a driver for possession of drugs with intent to distribute, it would make sense to search his text messages
for further evidence of the crime, since that function is commonly
used in conjunction with drug sales. But it would not seem to be
permissible for the officer to search through the arrestee's pictures
under the iPhoto function or the history section under his internet
browser because such applications likely have nothing to do with
drug sales. A rule limiting the search incident to arrest exception
to the crime of aITest would prevent police from roaming at large
among th(' thousands of pages of data held in the iPhnnc.

Change by different sovereign:
encouraging state legislatures
to adopt more protective rule
Scholars dispute the ability of state courts to provide greater
protection of constitutional rights than federal courts. Although
the debate rages, it is undisputed that, in the criminal procedure
context, a number of states have imposed greater restrictions on
searches and seizures under their state constitutions. Notably, numerous state courts have cabined the search incident to arrest exception under state law to narrower circumstances than authorized
by the Supreme Court.
One approach states courts might take is the one advocated
by Justice Scalia. If the Supreme Court refuses to limit the search
incident to arrest doctrine to searches of the arrestee for weapons
and evidence of the crime for which he has been arrested, then
the state courts could look to their own constitutions to do so. To
date, a handful of state courts have adopted this approach. State v.
Ringer, 674 P.2d 1240 (Wash. (983) (en banc); State v. Caraher,
653 P.2d 942 (Or. 1982) (en banc).
Moreover, we should look beyond state courts to consider the
role of state legislatures in crafting statutory protections. \Vhile
new criminal procedure rules typically come from courts, it would
be a mistake to ignore possible legislative solutions. And, indeed,
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legislatures have taken action in the past to narrow what they believe to be an overly broad search incident to arrest doctrine.
In the wake of the Supreme Court's expansive 1973 decision
in U.S. v. Robinson pennitting police to open al1 containers on a
person incident to a lawful arrest, the Massachusetts legislature
adopted statutory language specifically designed to narrow the
search incident to arrest doctrine. For over thirty years, that statute
has provided that
[a] search conducted incident to an arrest may be made
only for the purposes of seizing fruits, instrumentalities,
contraband and other evidence of the crime for which the
arrest has been made, in order to prevent its destruction or
concealment; and removing any weapons that the arrestee
might use to resist arrest or effect his escape. Property
seized as a result of a search in violation of the provisions
of this paragraph shall not be admissible in evidence in
criminal proceedings.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § I (West 2004).
Other state legislatures could revise their codes to follow the
Massachusetts model. Or those legislatures could take a different approach and authorize the seizure of iPhones or other wireless devices incident to arrest but prohibit warrantless searches of
those devices without a warrant.
The key question is, how likely are legislatures to take action
to protect iPhones from warrantless searches? Legislatures are
not typically in the business of limiting police officers' ability to
conduct criminal investigations. To the contrary, legislators' interests are typically in line with those of law enforcement and they
therefore enact statutes that favor expansive police authority. Yet,
when it comes to iPhones the situation might be different. Unlike
the faceless backdrop in which legislators typically award police
great investigatory powers, the scenarios in which an iPhone can
be searched incident to arrest are likely to resonate with legislators.
As typically middle- or upper-class individuals with teenage
or young adult children, legislators are one of the demographic
~rollps likely to purdHlse iPhnllcs. And while legislator:) rarely
commit the crimes of murder or rape, as mostly middle-dass
white men they are statistically more likely to be involved in computer climes such as financial misconduct or fraud. It is evidence
of these crimes that is most likely to accidentally Ulrn lip during
a search of an iPhone incident to an arrest, whether for nmning a
stop sign or driving while intoxicated. Moreover, while legislatures are unlikely to have illegal child pornography on their computers or iPhones, it is reasonable to assume many legislators have
downloaded "run-of-the-mill" pornography. While this material is
not illegal, its discovery would be embarrassing and politically
devastating.
Significant legislative protections for criminal defendants often arises in response to a particular legislator being put through
the criminal justice process. Thus, while legislators are tough on
crime and reluctant to reduce punishments or remove old crimes
from the books, it is reasonable to expect that legislators will create criminal procedure protections that track their own self-interest. It is therefore possible that legislators will enact laws limiting
the search of iPhones incident to arrest.
Moreover,legislators have incentive to enact such restrictions
to please constituents. \Vhile it is unlikely that a lobby will form
to press for a law exempting iPhones from the search incident to
arrest doctrine, it is entirely possible that in the near future a prominent business executive or other powerful and connected individual will be embarrassed when his iPhone is searched at a traffic
stop. And when those middle- and upper-class individuals-the
type who vote and, more importantly, have money to make cam-
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paign contributions-press for some legislative1action, lawmakers will have little reason to refuse them. The soft-an-crime label
tends not to stick when the new law bent;!fits a considerable majority and protects the middle-class right to priv~cy.

Change at the margins:
open application test
A more modest revision to the search incident to arrest doctrine, but one that nevertheless would eliminate the current brightline rule, would be for courts to adopt an open application test.
Under an open application approach, police would be permitted
to search any open application on the iPhone incident to arrest
but would not be authorized to look through applications that are
closed when the arrest is made. Thus, an individual who took steps
to dose the iPhoto application could expect the pictures contained
therein to remain ,private. More significantly, an individual who
kept her iPhone off entirely could avoid any search of its contents.
There are at least two problems with this approach: First, it
would be very difficult to know if officers are telling the truth
when they 'say an application was open. Because an iPhone can
be turned on si".1ply by tapping the touch screen and applications
can be activated simply by touching an icon, it would be easy for
officers to testify that an application was open at the time of arrest, even if it was in fact closed. Of course, the prospect of police
lying runs throughout Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Police
could just as easily lie and say they received consent to search the
trunk of a vehicle when they in fact did not, or that they smelled
marijuana when in fact there was no such smell.
A second and more compelling reason to reject the open application test is that it runs afoul of one of the original justifications
for the search incident to arrest doctrine: preventing the destruction of evidence. Just as police could quickly open a closed application on the iPhone, so too could a suspect. An arrestee skilled
at using his iPhone might be able to turn on the device, select an
application, and destroy text messag-es, emails, photos, or other
evidence in a matter of seconds.
Givell that the Supreme Court has adopted a ticiiotl that almust
any physical evidence-whether in a c1os~d or open (olltainerin the,arrestee's grasp could potentially be destroyed (even if the
arrestee is handcuffed) it would make little sense to draw a line
forbidding searches of closed applications on an electronic device
that an arrestee could easily open and destroy.

Changing bright-line rule: limiting
search incident to arrest doctrine to
five steps of searches
Another solution would be to limit police to only a fixed nUmber of steps when searching the contents of an-iPhone incident to
arrest. For instance, courts could set a bright-line rule that police
can take five steps, but no more, when rummaging through an
iPhone's contents. As with the open application test, this solution
likely causes more problems than it would solve, but is worth exploring briefly.
The primary virtue of the search incident to arrest doctrine is
that it provides bright-line rules that are easily understood and applied. Thus, police know that they can open an arrestee's wallet
but cannot search the trunk of his car. The primary detriment of
the search incident to arrest doctrine is that it pennits the police to
rummage through numerous layers of enclosed materials, even if
there is no probable cause to believe contraband is buried beneath.
This problem is particularly vexing with respect to the iPhone
because it contains layer upon layer of data. As previously dis15
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cussed, police conceivably could (1) tum on the phone; (2) open
an internet browser; (3) type in a web-based email account such
as www.hotmail.com; (4) log into the account (if the user id and
password are saved); (5) open a folder of messages; (6) open a
particular message; (7) read the message; (8) open the attachment
to the message; and so forth.
One compromise approach would be to create a bright-line
"five-level deep" rule (or some other admittedly arbitrary number)

limiting the search of iPhones to a total of five steps. Under such a
rule, the police could search five levels deep into an iPhone's contents, but no further. Thus, for example, police could (1) tum on
the phone; (2) open the internet browser; (3) type in a web-based
email account such as www.hotmail.com; (4) log into the account
(if the user id and password are saved); and (5) open a folder of
messages. If the officer completes the fifth step without finding
anything incriminating that could be destroyed, the officer would
need to stop searching. To search further, the officer would need

to prOCure a warrant.
The main virtue to this approach is that it puts an outer limit
on how far police may search electronic data while at the same
time leaving intact a relatively bright-line rule that makes clear
to police exactly how far they can go. On the other hand, whether
police exceeded the five steps would certainly be debated in individual cases. Judges would have to make findings of fact ranging
from the simple-whether the phone was already turned on when
the search incident to arrest began, thus not counting as one of
the five steps-to more fuzzy inquiries. For instance, when police linked from one webpage to another, were they taking two
steps, or just one? This sort of unguided fact-finding is exactly
what courts have tried to avoid by advocating a bright-line search
incident to arrest rule.
Perhaps more obviously troubling, selecting a certain number
of searches- for instance, saying that police can search five levels
deep into an iPhone, but not six - is terribly arbitrary. \Vhile courts
could say t~e number of levels is correlated to the likelihood that
the arrestee could reach that data and destroy it, selecting a level
would still be beyond the institutional capacity of courts. Moreover, no comparnblc five-step rille exists for searches of tangible
evidence found during a typical search incident to alTest. If police
can exceed five steps to discover drugs in a small bag hidden inside a box lying under some papers in the glove compartment of a
car, it is difficult to juslify a five-step rule only for iPhoncs.

Distinguishing between data on device
and remotely-stored data accessible
from device
Finally, courts could try to draw a conceptual line between data
that is "on" or "in" the iPhone and data that is simply accessible
via the iPhone. This would essentially be drawing a line between
the iPhone's internet browser function and its other applications.
An arrestee's pictures in his iPhoto application, his text messages,
and his incoming call history would be considered contained "in"
the phone. If internet service were cut off, the owner of the phone
would still be able to access these features because the data has
been downloaded to the phone. By contrast, web-based email ac~
counts or other material that an individual accesses over the internet are not typically downloaded to the phone and are insteaq,
for lack of a better phrase, simply floating around on electronic
servers in cyberspace. Because such data is not physically present on the iPhone without proactively seeking it out, courts and
legislatures could draw a line forbidding such searches incident to
arrest while allowing police to search applications that have data
pennanently on the iPhone.

16

One wrinkle to this approach might be if the internet browser
that allows the user to access infonnation floating in cyberspace
is open when the officer searches the iPhone. For instance, what if
the officer conducting the search incideht to ~rrest discovers that
the internet browser is open to a web-based email account and the
selected email has incriminating information in it? Surely it would
not make sense to say that the officer could se~h the rest of the
iPhone's applications but not the open web~based email. One solution to this problem would be to harken back to the original search
incident to arrest jurisprudence that allows a full-scale search of
some areas beyond the person of the arrestee if the area is in the
immediate grabbing space. For instance, the search incident to arrest doctrine typically does not allow a search of the trunk of a
vehicle, but if the trunk is open and the arrestee is standing near
it, then such a search is pennissible. In the hypothetical scenario
outlined above, web-based email can be analogized to the trunk
of a car. The web-based email, banking infonnation, or MySpace
page, would typically be considered to be outside the grabbing
space of the suspect. However, when the webpage is open in the
internet browser at the time of arrest it would be within the ar~
restee's immediate grabbing space.
Thinking in tenns of physical tangible space, an approach that
differentiates between material downloaded onto the iPhone and
material that is simply accessible via the iPhone seems to make
sense. Just as officers could search the cigarette pack in Mr. Robinson's pocket, they can also search the photos he is carrying on
his iPhone. And just as the police could not search Mr. Robinson's
medical records stored in his house (rather than on his person), the
police also could not search electronic data not currently down~
loaded onto his phone.
Yet, the comparison with Robinson's medical records fails at
a certain level when we consider that one purpose of the search
incident to arrest doctrine is to prevent destruction of evidence.
Of course, Mr. Robinson could not destroy the medical records
in his house while being arrested at a traffic stop. Yet, he could
quickly open his internet browser, log onto his web-based email
account. and dt>stroy incriminating t'vidence without ('wr It'a\'in.~
the traftle stop. Nevertheless, this appronch is conceptually promising because it does not require a wholesale revision of the search
incident to arrest doctrine, which has been framed with tangible
physical evidence in mind.

Conclusion
At the end of the day, all of the approaches outlined above appear to be somewhat unsatisfying. Pennitting the police to search
only for evidence related to the purpose of arrest would improve
the doctrine for all cases, not just those involving iPhones, but it
has recently been rejected by a majority of the Supreme Court.
Asking state legislatures to limit police to search incident to arrest only for evidence related to the arrest is plausible, but highly
unlikely to occur in many states. An open application test may
encourage police deception and will likely create the types of fac~
tual disputes that the bright-line search incident to arrest doctrine
was designed to avoid. A five-step limit wil11ikewise raise factual
questions that are best avoided. Finally, while a rule that differentiates between data on the iPhone and data accessible via the
phone is the most conceptually pure, it does not account for the
possibility that arrestees could still destroy data that is merely accessible via the iPhone. Nevertheless, despite the flaws associated
with each proposal, all are likely preferable to doing nothing and
allowing police to search thousands of pages of electronic data
without probable cause or a warrant.

© 2009, Thomson Reuters

